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Restaurant tipping has come under assault in the last few years with numerous 
journalists and commentators calling for its abolition.1 Moreover, many res- 
taurateurs have heeded these calls, with nearly a dozen restaurants replacing 
voluntary tipping with either automatic service charges or higher wages paid 
thru higher menu prices in the last year alone.2 Among those eliminating 
tipping in 2015 were: 
• Union Square Hospitality Group in NYC,3  
• Dirt Candy in NYC,4  
• Bar Marco in Pittsburgh,5  
• the Radler in Chicago,6 
• Coi in San Francisco,7 
• Manos Nouveau in San Francisco,8 
• The Walrus and the Carpenter in Seattle,9  
• Ivar’s Seafood in Seattle,10  
• Victory 44 in Minneapolis,11 and 
• Upton 43 in Minneapolis.12  
 
These moves away from traditional tipping were sparked in large part by 
recent efforts to increase the minimum wage, which many restaurateurs hope 
to pay for with the service charges or higher menu prices that replace 
voluntary tipping. Recent efforts to decrease the tip credit (which allows 
employers to reduce tipped employees’ wages in consideration of receiving 
tips) also contribute to the anti-tipping movement, because smaller tip credits 
reduce any financial benefits of tipping and threaten to exacerbate already 
large and growing wage inequalities between front and back of house staff.  
However, these developments are just the latest round in a recurrent debate 
over the advantages and disadvantages of tipping. Similar experiments with 
no-tipping policies and restaurant industry calls for the elimination of tipping 
occurred in the 1980s when a series of new laws increased restaurants’  
responsibilities for paying taxes on tip income.13 Moreover, the 1980s debate 
was just a continuation of a broader controversy over tipping that goes back 
to the early 1900s when the practice was imported into the United States from 
Europe.14  
The debate over the advantages and disadvantages to restaurants of using 
voluntary tips to compensate wait staff becomes louder and more salient 
when new government regulations such as decreased tip credits threaten to 
increase the restaurateurs’ tip-related costs. However, the issues in that debate 
transcend the effects of government regulation. Moreover, those issues remain 
hotly contested in part because so little evidence is available to resolve them 
and because the little evidence that does exist is either weak or not widely 
known. In 2006, I attempted to address these problems in a Cornell Hospitality 
Report that identified the key issues in this debate, reviewed the little  
available research, and raised questions in need of further research.15 That 
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report did not have as much impact on the industry or academy as I had 
hoped, but it did provide a guide for my own program of research on tipping. 
Consequently, some 10 years after that report, there is more empirical  
evidence on many of the issues it identified. That new evidence combined 
with the current interest in abandoning tipping, prompts me to update the 
earlier report with this article.  
That report on tipping and its alternatives was structured around the 
following eight issues: consumer preferences, price partitioning, price dis- 
crimination, server incentives, pay levels, employee recruitment and retention, 
income tax evasion, and employment discrimination. Those issues remain 
central to the debate regarding voluntary tipping, but in retrospect, they are 
too abstract and academic to capture the attention and hold the interest of 
most people. Therefore, I use a different structure for this report and discuss 
those eight issues in the context of five interrelated questions that I believe 
will be of obvious importance and immediate appeal to industry practitioners 
and the public alike. Those questions are:  
1. Does tipping under (or over) pay servers?; 
2. Does tipping help (or hurt) efforts to attract and retain good workers?; 
3. Does tipping increase (or decrease) customer satisfaction with service?; 
4. Does tipping increase demand by reducing the costs of eating out or per- 
ceptions of restaurant expensiveness?; and 
5. Does tipping increase (or decrease) the costs of doing business? 
 
1. Does Tipping under- (or over-) Pay Servers? 
 
Many people believe that tipping together with the tipped sub-minimum wage 
underpays servers in the sense that their total incomes are often too small to 
comfortably live on. For example, Sylvia Allegretto and David Cooper report 
that the median hourly wage (including tips) for waiters and bartenders in 
the U.S. is only about 60 percent of the median for all U.S. workers ($10.11 
vs $16.48) and that the percentage of tipped workers earning poverty level 
incomes is twice that of non-tipped workers (12.8% vs. 6.5%).16 However, 
these data are based on self-reports of waiters and bartenders, who are likely 
to substantially understate their actual incomes in an attempt to reduce their 
tax liabilities.17 Moreover, federal and state laws ensure that total wages (in- 
cluding tips) meet or exceed the regular minimum wage for that jurisdiction, 
so income levels among low wage workers have more to do with the number 
of hours worked and with the minimum wage level than with whether that 
income comes from tips or paid wages. Thus, the idea that tipped servers are 
paid too little to live comfortably (even if true) has little bearing on the debate 
about tipping versus other forms of restaurant employee compensation. 
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Servers’ standards of living notwithstanding, there is a sense in which  
tipping may overpay servers. One could make a case that tipping pays  
restaurant servers more than is necessary to ensure a sufficient number of 
competent workers. Though restaurateurs and commentators stop short of 
saying that servers are overpaid, many of them complain that servers’ tip 
incomes often exceed those of equally skilled and important non-tipped 
restaurant workers.18 Since waiting tables requires no formal education or 
previous experience and only brief on-the-job training, there seems to be 
little economic rationale for paying waiters and waitresses more than cooks, 
hosts, and other non-tipped restaurant workers.19 Assuming that equally 
competent servers could be recruited at wage levels that attract non-tipped 
restaurant workers and that tipped servers do earn more than these other 
workers, then servers are arguably overpaid, and replacing tipping with 
service charges or higher menu prices would allow restaurateurs to reduce 
the total payment to servers and to redirect the recovered overpayments to 
back-of-house wages or other purposes.  
Given the documented tendency for tipped workers to hide income,  the 
least reliable evidence regarding income levels is likely to come from em- 
ployee reports to the government, with more reliable evidence coming from 
anonymous employee reports to private individuals or organizations, and the 
most reliable evidence coming from employers. That may be why the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the median hourly income of waiters 
and waitresses is less than that of cooks ($9.01 vs $ 10.16), while three recent 
non-governmental surveys indicate that tipped restaurant workers make sub- 
stantially more than non-tipped restaurant workers.20 First, a recent compen- 
sation and benefits survey of NYC restaurant companies conducted by the 
NYC Hospitality Alliance found that the median hourly income (including 
tips) of servers exceeded that of line cooks by 112 percent ($27.50 vs.  
$13.00) and that of hosts by 99 percent ($27.50 vs $13.76), with this pay 
discrepancy having a similar magnitude for both casual and fine-dining 
restaurants.21 Second, a recent survey of 1,150 restaurant managers from large 
metro areas across the United States conducted by researchers at Cornell and 
Ohio State found that median weekly wages (including tips) of front-of-house 
employees exceed that of back-of-house employees by 29 percent ($464 vs 
$360) in moderately priced restaurants, by 67 percent ($673 vs $402) in 
casual fine-dining restaurants, and by 80 percent ($792 vs $441) in upscale 
fine-dining restaurants.22 Finally, a survey of 15,000 restaurant employees 
conducted by Payscale.com found that the median total hourly pay (in- 
cluding tips) for 18 different restaurant jobs was positively related to the 
percentage of that total pay coming from tips (r = .65, n = 18, p < .003; see 
Exhibit 1.1).23 Together, these studies provide compelling evidence that  
tipping does pay restaurant servers substantially more than their non-tipped 
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co-workers. This suggests that restaurants replacing tipping with service 
charges or higher menu prices could pay servers only a portion of the 
increased revenue (by paying them wages that are more in line with that of 
their co-workers) and could then use the remainder to pay the back of house 
more or to increase profits.  
 
Exhibit 1.1. The more restaurant jobs rely on tips as part of compensation, the more 
those jobs pay per hour.  
 
 
Source of data: Payscale.com. 
 
The greater income that tipped restaurant workers make compared to non-
tipped restaurant workers occurs despite the fact that the minimum cash 
wage for tipped workers is often substantially lower than that for non-tipped 
workers. The difference between tipped and regular minimum wages varies 
across states, so the wage deficit that tipping must overcome is smaller in 
some states than others. This means that the pay discrepancy between tipped 
and non-tipped restaurant workers should be greater in states with smaller tip 
credits as long as the tip levels do not sizably increase with the states’ tip  
credit. I was able to test this expectation with unpublished data from the 
survey of restaurant managers by Rosemary Batt and her colleagues, who 
generously provided me with the needed data.24 As expected, the pay premium 
going to front-of-house workers (at moderate restaurants) was smaller in 
states with larger tip credits (r = -.54, n = 21, p < .02; see Exhibit 1.2). This 
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finding is important because it suggests that the overpayment of tipped work- 
ers and, with it, the case for abandoning tipping is stronger in states  with 
smaller tip credits. It also suggests that reducing or eliminating tip credits, as 
many are advocating, would exacerbate the overpayment of tipped workers and 
make the case for abandoning tipping even stronger in the affected states. 
 
Exhibit 1.2. The front of house pay premium is smaller in states with larger tip  
credits (disparity between regular and tipped minimum wages).  
 
 
 
2. Does Tipping Help (or Hurt) Efforts  
    to Attract and Retain Good Workers? 
 
Some restaurateurs fear abandoning tipping because they believe it helps them 
attract and retain better workers. One rationale for this belief is that the pay 
premium I just discussed may attract higher quality workers into the profes- 
sion.25 A second rationale is that the performance-contingent nature of tip 
income should appeal to and reward competent workers more than less com- 
petent ones.26  
Others argue that tipping may reduce the quality of workers attracted to, 
and staying in, the restaurant industry. Tip income is inherently variable,  
which may be unappealing to workers seeking to support themselves and a 
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family.27 Thus, tipping may attract single workers with a part-time or tem- 
porary mentality, thereby undermining efforts to build a professional wait-
staff. A definitive assessment of these competing possibilities is not possible, 
but a number of research findings that speak to these human resource issues 
are available and are reviewed below.  
 
Do pay premiums attract more and better workers to tipped jobs? 
First, let’s consider the concern that a reduction in income potential following 
the elimination of tipping will reduce the number and quality of the applicants 
for those jobs. Economic theory tells us that better pay should attract more 
applicants for a job, but it is not clear that the pay premiums tipping gives 
servers are necessary to fill those service positions with competent workers. 
Data to test this issue are surprisingly hard to obtain, but if we use job per- 
formance as an indicator of worker quality, we can test it with WD Partners’ 
“Consumer Picks Survey” data. Using these data, I calculated average  
customer service ratings for family-dining and full-service restaurants in 32 
states, while controlling for numerous rater characteristics and the restaurant 
chain being rated.28 Those state level service ratings did increase with the 
previously described 2013 wage gap between front- and back-of-house 
restaurant employees (r = .49, n = 20, p < .03; see Exhibit 2.1). However, the 
increment in average service rating is less than .02 out of 5 points for every 
dollar that front-of-house employees’ hourly pay exceeds that of back-of-
house employees.29 In other words, cutting the excess pay going to servers by 
$10 per hour would reduce average service ratings by only one-fifth of one 
point on a five point scale. These analyses suggest that the pay premiums 
associated with tipping do attract somewhat better service workers as reflected 
in customer ratings of the service levels those workers provide, but not enough 
to justify those premiums. 
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Exhibit 2.1. States with larger pay differences between front- and back-of-house 
restaurant staff have slightly better restaurant service. 
 
 
 
Does the variable and performance-contingent nature of tip income attract 
more or less desirable applicants and workers? 
Second, let’s consider the opposing views regarding the effects of tipping’s 
variable and performance-contingent nature. The idea that tipping selectively 
attracts less desirable workers assumes that only relatively young, less expe- 
rienced, and part-time workers are willing to put up with the uncertainty of 
tip income. The opposing idea that tipping selectively attracts more desirable 
workers assumes that more competent workers earn larger tips and like work- 
ing for tips more than do less competent workers, and that greater income 
and liking for the mode of compensation both increase satisfaction with and 
longevity in tipped jobs (see Exhibit 2.2). Evidence about one or more of these 
assumed relationships is available from several studies described below.  
 
Exhibit 2.2. Model showing how tipping may help restaurants to selectively attract 
and retain better workers. 
 
Worker Quality  Tipping Mediator  Attraction/Retention 
-Service orientation 
-Years experience as 
a server 
 
     
 
-Average Tip Size 
-Attitude toward 
Working for Tips 
 
  
 
-Job Satisfaction 
-Intentions/Thoughts/Timing 
Quitting Job 
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I recently conducted an unpublished survey of a large and diverse, but unrep- 
resentative, sample of the U.S. population, and asked respondents how much 
they would like or dislike working under different compensation systems if 
they had to work as a waiter or waitress at a full-service restaurant.30 Exhibit 
2.3 summarizes responses to that inquiry. I found that working for tips plus 
the regular minimum wage is the most popular compensation system (with a 
net favorability of +71%), but working for tips plus a subminimum wage is 
one of the least popular compensation systems (with a net favorability of only 
+1%). Working for service charges (with an average net favorability of +19) 
and high hourly wages (with an average net favorability of +51) are both 
preferred to working for tips plus subminimum wages. These data suggest that 
abandoning tipping will lower employee satisfaction with the compensation 
system only in those states with no tip credit. For those states with tip credits, 
abandoning tipping may actually increase employee satisfaction with the com- 
pensation system, especially if tipping is replaced with high hourly wages. 
 
Exhibit 2.3. Attitudes toward working for different types of compensation in a large 
and diverse, but unrepresentative, sample of the U.S. population 
 
Method of Compensation Dislikea Likea Net 
Favorability 
(Like minus 
Dislike) 
Tips with Subminimum Wage – 
Servers make less than the regular minimum wage, but 
keep the tips they receive 
44% 45% +1% 
Tips with Regular Minimum Wage – 
Servers make the regular minimum wage and keep the 
tips they receive 
9% 80% +71% 
Tip Pool with Subminimum Wage –  
Servers make less than the regular minimum wage, but 
receive a share of the tip pool that all tips go into 
69% 23% -46% 
Tip Pool with Regular Minimum Wage –  
Servers make the regular minimum wage and a share of 
the tip pool that all tips go into 
33% 52% +19% 
15% Service Charge (No Additional Tipping) –  
Servers receive all the money from a 15% automatic 
service charge to their customers and are not permitted 
to accept tips 
34% 49% +15% 
18% Service Charge (No Additional Tipping) –  
Servers receive all the money from an 18% automatic 
service charge to their customers and are not permitted 
to accept tips 
31% 54% +23% 
$18/Hour Wage (No Additional Tipping) –  
Servers make $18 per hour and are not permitted to 
accept tips 
20% 70% +50% 
$21/Hour Wage (No Additional Tipping) –  
Servers make $21 per hour and are not permitted to 
accept tips 
20% 71% +51% 
a Collapsing across four different levels each of dislike and like from ratings on a nine point scale 
ranging from 1 = dislike very much to 9 = like very much. 
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The attitudes summarized in Exhibit 2.3 reflect the opinions of a sample of 
the general U.S. population. Arguably, those attitudes are less important than 
the opinions of the best prospective restaurant employees, namely, those 
who have worked for tips, and who are outgoing and social (extraverted), 
emotionally stable (non-neurotic), friendly and easy going (agreeable), and 
dutiful, punctual, and hard-working (conscientious). If these selected groups 
of people have a strong preference for one particular method of compensation, 
then abandoning tipping may affect recruitment and retention of good servers 
even if the general population does not share that preference. To see whether 
the opinions of these select groups do differ from those of the general  
population, I regressed rated attitudes toward several of the compensation 
systems on a number of respondent characteristics measured in the survey 
(see Exhibit 2.4). Those analyses indicate that though there are some reliable 
differences in liking for specific compensation systems, the effects are small, 
and I conclude that the attitudes summarized in Exhibit 2.3 are held by many 
attractive prospective employees. 
 
Exhibit 2.4. Attitudes toward working under different compensation systems do not 
vary much across respondents’ personality and geo-demographic characteristics 
(standardized regression coefficients). 
Respondent 
Characteristics 
/Predictors 
Attitude Toward Working for 
 Tips with Regular 
Minimum Wage 
Tips with Sub-
Minimum Wage 
18% Service 
Charges 
$18 
Hourly 
Wages 
Extraversion .03 .11** -.08* -.06 
Neuroticism -.04 -.04 -.01 -.01 
Conscientiousness .07 .05 -.03 -.10* 
Agreeableness .02 .05 .05 .07* 
Openness .07* -.03 .03 .05 
Worked for Tips 
Beforea 
.04 .04 -.02 -.01 
Age .08 .03 .003 .08* 
Femalea .05 -.03 -.004 .06 
Education -.09* -.01 -.01 .01 
Income -.09* -.01 .06 -.09* 
Whitea .03 .01 -.01 -.02 
Midwesta -.01 .10* -.06 -.07 
Southa .03 .09* -.03 -.01 
Westa  -.03 .02 -.03 .01 
     
R2 .06*** .04** .01 .05** 
n 834 837 837 836 
a yes=1, no=0,  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Three other studies have examined the relationships of servers’ average tip 
sizes or servers’ attitudes toward working for tips with their service or guest 
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orientation, years of waiting experience, job satisfaction, and intentions or 
thoughts about quitting.31 Their results are summarized in Exhibit 2.5. 
Overall, more experienced and service-oriented waiters and waitresses earn 
larger average tips and like working for tips more than do less experienced 
and service-oriented waiters and waitresses. Furthermore, servers who earn 
larger tips and prefer working for tips like their jobs more, think less about 
quitting, and intend to stay in the job longer. These findings are all consistent 
with the idea that tipping helps to attract and retain more experienced and 
service-oriented workers. However, the observed correlations are weak and 
the selective attraction and retention effects of tipping depend on linking 
these weak relationships together (see Exhibit 2.2), which means that those 
selective attraction and retention effects are of little consequence.32  
 
Exhibit 2.5. Tip averages and attitude toward working for tips are only weakly 
related to desirable server characteristics (correlations). 
 Average Tip Size Prefer Working for Tips 
(over Service Charges) 
Service/Guest Orientation .14a     (n = 130) 
.18**b   (n = 334) 
.06c     (n = 691) 
.14**b   (n = 336) 
.17**c   (n = 693) 
Years Experience as a Server .26**b  (n = 330) 
.17**c  (n = 685) 
.19**b   (n = 332) 
.18**c   (n = 687) 
Job Satisfaction .26**a (n = 130) 
.24**c  (n = 689) 
.32**c   (n = 691) 
Intentions/Thoughts/Timing of Quitting -.29**a (n = 130) 
-.03c    (n = 692) 
.03c      (n = 694) 
**p < .01, a from unpublished data collected by Alex Susskind  and reported in Lynn (2003),  
b from Lynn, Kwortnik & Sturman (2011), c from Lynn (2016b)  
 
In summary, the available evidence suggests that the pay-premiums provided 
by tipping and its pay-for-performance nature do help attract and retain more 
desirable workers, but those effects are weak and do not justify the pay-
premiums that tipping gives servers.  
 
3. Does Tipping Increase (or Decrease) Customer Satisfaction with Service? 
 
As is the case with other issues connected with tipping, I see two opposing 
positions regarding tipping and customer satisfaction. One position is that 
tipping increases customer satisfaction in three ways. First, many consumers 
like tipping and the control it gives them, so the opportunity to tip is a positive 
feature of the service experience that may directly increase some customers’ 
satisfaction.33 Second, most consumers believe that tipping motivates servers 
to provide better service, so it may increase consumer expectations of service, 
which would positively bias their perceptions of actual service and increase 
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their satisfaction.34 Finally, tipping may increase actual service levels by 
motivating servers to deliver better service.35  
The opposing position is that tipping decreases customer satisfaction in 
four ways. First, some consumers dislike tipping, so social pressures to tip 
are negative features of the service encounter that may directly decrease at 
least those customers’ satisfaction. Second, tipping may undermine servers’ 
intrinsic desires to serve their customers by focusing servers’ attention on the 
immediate pursuit of money and the resulting inauthenticity of service may 
decrease customer satisfaction. Third, tipping may discourage teamwork 
among servers, which may decrease actual service levels and, with it, cus- 
tomer satisfaction.36 Finally, tipping may encourage discrimination in service 
delivery to consumers perceived to be poor tippers, which would decrease 
the satisfaction of those consumers. Let’s consider the empirical evidence  
that addresses these opposing arguments.  
 
Do people like tipping? 
A number of online surveys have assessed consumers’ attitudes toward 
tipping and its alternatives over the past several years (see Exhibit 3.1).37 
Unfortunately, uncertainty about the sampling methods as well as variability 
in question wording and findings severely limit the usefulness of  these 
surveys. For this reason, I asked respondents to my previously mentioned 
survey how much they (as consumers) liked or disliked a variety of different 
tipping policies in full-service restaurants.38 Their answers to those questions 
are summarized in Exhibit 3.2. Voluntary tipping is clearly the most liked 
policy (with a net favorability of 39%), but service-inclusive menu pricing 
also has a net favorability (of about 17%). Only automatic service charges are 
disliked by more people than like them. How well these attitudes generalize 
across geo-demographic segments was assessed in regression analyses sum- 
marized in Exhibit 3.3. Older respondents tended to like tipping more, and 
its alternatives less, than did younger respondents, but these differences were 
small, and few other reliable differences were observed. Thus, the results in 
Exhibit 3.2 are reasonably descriptive of the consumer attitudes that most 
restaurateurs in the U.S. are likely to face at the current time.  
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Exhibit 3.1. Summary of recent tipping surveys. 
2012 online survey by Google Consumer Surveys (n = 1,418) 
At restaurants, do you prefer to have tips/gratuity automatically added to the bill? 
Yes                                        12% 
No                                        42% 
Only for large groups         32% 
It depends                           14% 
2013 online survey at surveymonkey.com (n =  500) 
If given the choice between tipping structures, which would you prefer?   
Current pricing structure                85%   
Include gratuity into menu prices   15% 
2013 survey by Zagat (n = ?) 
How would you feel about a no-tipping policy if it meant higher menu prices? 
Hate it                                                         28%    
Not sure                                                      34%    
Love it                                                        21%   
Like it but only in upscale restaurants      17% 
2014 online survey by Trip Advisor (n = 3,700) 
Would it be better if tips were included in the bill? (paraphrased) 
Yes  33% 
2014 online survey by Ask Your Target Market (n = 380) 
Do you think it should be mandatory for people to tip servers? 
Yes                                                                                                 23%    
No, but people should tip most of the time                                   48%  
No, tipping should be reserved for exceptional service               16%  
No, service charges should just be included in food prices          9%  
No opinion                                                                                    3% 
2015 online survey by NYC Hospitality Alliance and Audience Research & Analysis  
(n = 535) 
I think tipping is a good system 
Agree                                                                53% 
Disagree                                                           24% 
Neither                                                             23% 
 
Preferred way of handling tipping at casual/family-style restaurants 
Cash                                                                 31% 
Credit card                                                      40% 
Administrative fee of 15% to 20%                  18% 
Increase menu prices 15% to 20%                 11% 
 
Preferred way of handling tipping at fine dining establishments 
Cash                                                               37%                                     
Credit card                                                    29% 
Administrative fee of 15% to 20%                22% 
Increase menu prices 15% to 20%              12% 
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Exhibit 3.2. Consumer attitudes toward tipping and alternative policies at full -
service restaurants among a large and heterogeneous, but unrepresentative, sample 
of the U.S. population. 
Tipping Policy Dislikea Likea Net Favorability 
(Like minus Dislike) 
Tipping is Voluntary but Expected  
(as per current custom) 
24% 63% +39% 
Automatic Service Charges are added to 
all checks (additional tipping is permitted 
but not expected) 
52% 35% -17% 
Automatic Service Charges are added to 
all checks (additional tipping is not 
permitted) 
50% 38% -12% 
Higher Menu Prices include full 
compensation for servers (tipping is 
permitted but not expected) 
35% 51% +16% 
Higher Menu Prices include full 
compensation for servers (tipping is not 
permitted) 
35% 53% +18% 
a Collapsing across three levels each of like and dislike from ratings on a seven point scale 
ranging from 1 = strongly dislike to 7 = strongly like.  
 
Exhibit 3.3. Consumer attitudes toward different tipping policies do not vary much 
across their geo-demographic characteristics (standardized regression coefficients). 
Consumer 
Characteristics/ 
Predictors 
Attitude Toward Policy of 
 Tips 
Expected 
Service 
Charge 
Plusa 
Service 
Charge 
Onlyb 
Service- 
Inclusive 
Menu Pricing 
Plusa 
Service- 
Inclusive 
Menu 
Pricing 
Onlyb 
Age .07* -.10** -.11** -.11** -.07* 
Femalec  .07* .02 .002 .06 .03 
Education -.01 .03 .05 .04 .10** 
Income .04 -.004 -.003 -.04 -.03 
Whitec -.002 -.03 -.07* -.02 -.01 
Midwestc  .03 .01 -.01 -.002 -.03 
Southc  .05 .09* .04 .04 .01 
Westc  -.01 .02 -.03 .03 -.02 
Worked for Tipsc  .03 -.05 -.07* -.08* -.11** 
      
R2 .02 .02* .03** .03** .03** 
n 844 844 842 844 844 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, a Tipping is permitted but not expected., b Tipping is not 
permitted. c yes=1, no=0 
 
To get a sense of whether these attitudes toward different tipping policies 
would affect patronage of restaurants adopting the different policies, Shuo 
Wang and I conducted three experiments that speak to this issue.39 These 
experiments presented large and diverse samples of the U.S. population a 
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restaurant menu or flyer that contained information about the restaurant’s 
tipping policy, which was randomly varied across respondents, and asked 
them to rate the fairness of those policies and the likelihood of going to the 
restaurant (among other things). All three studies found that automatic  
gratuities were perceived as less fair than voluntary tipping policies and that 
the lower perceived fairness of automatic gratuities reduced the average rated 
likelihood of going to the restaurant by .2 to .4 out of 7 points. One of the 
studies also included a no-tipping, service-inclusive menu pricing policy and 
found that the lower perceived fairness of that policy compared to voluntary 
tipping reduced the average rated likelihood of going to the restaurant by .2 
out of 7 points.40 These findings suggest that attitudes toward tipping policies 
are likely to affect patronage intentions, but only to a small degree. 
 
Does tipping increase consumer expectations of service quality? 
Surveys have found that most consumers believe that they tip based on the 
service they receive and, therefore, that tipping motivates servers to deliver 
good service.41 This suggests that tipping is likely to increase consumers’  
expectations of service quality and that abandoning tipping might lower their 
service expectations. This possibility is important because expectations  
influence both consumer choices and consumer experiences. If tipping does 
increase consumer expectations of service quality, then consumers may be 
less likely to try a no-tipping restaurant and may have a negatively biased 
perception of those no-tipping restaurants they do try.  
One of my experiments with Shuo Wang tested the effects of tipping 
policies on expectations of service.42 The respondents’ expectations of service 
quality where unaffected by whether they believed the restaurant had an 
automatic gratuity or a voluntary tipping policy. This surprising finding needs 
to be replicated, but if it is reliable, it suggests that replacing tipping with 
automatic service charges may not lower expectations about a restaurant’s 
service quality. On the other hand, study respondents did rate the expected 
service quality half a point lower out of 7 points when they believed the 
restaurant had a service-inclusive menu pricing policy than when they 
believed it had a voluntary tipping policy. Although this effect in turn 
lowered the average rated likelihood of patronage by only .1 out of 7 points, 
a half-point difference in average ratings of expected service levels is not 
trivial.43 Thus, restaurants contemplating replacing tipping with service-
inclusive menu prices should consider this cost and ways to mitigate it.  
Presumably fancier menu items, more varied wine selections, higher prices, 
classier employee uniforms, nicer table wear and décor, and other cues asso- 
ciated with upscale, fine-dining establishments could all be used to create 
high service expectations even in the absence of voluntary tipping.44  
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Does tipping motivate servers to deliver better service? 
Tipping is supposed to be an incentive and reward for good service, but the 
jury is still out on how much it really motivates servers to deliver better  
service. Early research found that tip sizes were only weakly related to 
customers’ ratings of service quality, leading me to doubt tipping’s value as 
an incentive for better service.45 However, more recent research has led me 
to modify that conclusion. Three surveys of restaurant waiters and waitresses 
indicate that many servers mistakenly believe the relationship between tips 
and service is strong.46 For example, the most recent of these surveys asked 
almost 700 restaurant servers from across the U.S. to rate how large an effect 
the quality of their service has on the size of tips they receive, using a seven-
point scale.47 Seventy percent of the respondents rated the service-tipping 
relationship above the mid-point on this scale (see Exhibit 3.4), indicating 
that they thought their service had moderately to large effects on their tips. 
Perhaps servers need to have these inaccurate perceptions, because the per- 
ceptions contribute to servers’ feelings of control and reduce servers’ feelings 
that they depend on charity.  
 
Exhibit 3.4. Despite the weak actual service-tipping relationship, restaurant servers 
believe that delivering better service results in larger tips. 
 
 
Regardless of how they are developed and maintained, servers’ beliefs that 
tips are strongly related to service suggests that tipping does motivate servers 
to provide better service. Further supporting this conclusion are two studies I 
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conducted with Rob Kwortnik and Bill Ross.48 In one study, 469 current or 
former servers read a scenario describing a restaurant and indicated (with 7-
point scales) how often they would engage in various customer- and sales-
oriented behaviors if they worked as a server in that restaurant. The customer-
oriented behaviors included checking up on the table, complimenting customers’ 
food choices, and thanking customers while the sales-oriented behaviors 
included recommending branded and high price selections and speeding up 
service to turn the table. The scenario was randomly varied to present re- 
spondents with one of three tipping policies: voluntary tipping, an automatic 
gratuity, or no tipping with high wages. The results are depicted in Exhibit 
3.5. Customer-oriented behavior was highest under a voluntary tipping policy 
(mean = 4.9), intermediate under an automatic gratuity policy (mean = 4.4), 
and lowest under a wages-only policy (mean = 3.9), with all of these differ- 
ences being statistically reliable. Sales-oriented behavior was significantly 
higher under both voluntary tipping (mean = 4.8) and automatic gratuity 
policies (mean = 5.1), which did not reliably differ from one another, than 
under a wages-only policy (mean = 2.9). These findings suggest that replacing 
tipping with automatic service charges will reduce customer-oriented, 
though not sales-oriented, behaviors and that replacing tipping with wages 
only will reduce both customer- and sales-oriented behaviors.  
 
Exhibit 3.5. Hypothetical sales- and customer-oriented behavior is lower under a 
wages only policy than a voluntary tipping policy and customer-oriented (but not 
sales-oriented) behavior is lower under a service charge policy than voluntary tipping 
policy. 
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In a second study, we asked over a thousand restaurant servers in the U.S. to 
indicate how often they engaged in nine positive service behaviors (such as 
introducing themselves by name, smiling at customers, and complimenting 
customers’ food choices) and how large an effect they thought their service 
had on their tips. Consistent with a motivational effect of tipping, we found 
that the likelihood that servers would engage in the positive service behaviors 
increased with their belief about how strongly service affects tip size (r = 
.17, n = 1171, p < .001). Note that this effect was not nearly as large or 
strong as those in the hypothetical scenario experiment described above. That 
could be because the hypothetical scenario experiment overstated the strength 
of the effects that can be expected on actual behavior. However, it is also 
possible that the comparison of service across different levels of perceived 
service-tip contingency understates the motivational effects of tipping because 
servers find the prospect of earning even slightly larger tips more motivating 
than working for a set service charge or wage. 
 
Does tipping reduce service authenticity? 
Psychological research has found that extrinsic rewards (such as tips) reduce 
intrinsic motivation.49 To the extent that intrinsically motivated behavior 
comes across as more authentic than extrinsically motivated behavior, tipping 
may decrease the perceived authenticity of service. Such an effect would be 
undesirable, because researchers have found that consumers are able to 
distinguish authentic emotional labor from feigned emotional displays and 
prefer the former to the latter.50 Consistent with this concern about tipping 
reducing servers’ intrinsic motivation, Catherine Curtis and colleagues found 
that tipped restaurant workers rated two intrinsic work motivations – the 
importance of interesting work and gratitude for a job well done – as less 
important than did their non-tipped co-workers.51 However, Curtis’s study 
involved a small sample, many comparisons, and weak effects, so her find- 
ings may be false positives (Type 1 errors). In addition, her comparison of 
tipped with non-tipped workers’ motivation confounded tipping with other 
job characteristics, so it is not clear that tipping produced the differences she 
observed even if they are reliable.  
Arguing against the idea that tipping reduces intrinsic motivation are 
several studies indicating that servers (correctly) believe that a variety of tip-
enhancing tactics give them control over their tip income.52 Perceptions of 
empowerment and control have been shown to mitigate and even reverse the 
negative effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation.53 Thus, by 
enhancing servers’ perceptions of control over their incomes, tipping may 
actually increase (rather than decrease) servers’ intrinsic motivation and the 
authenticity of service. 
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Does tipping motivate service discrimination? 
Although tipping generally enhances servers’ motivation to deliver good ser- 
vice, many people argue that it has the opposite effect on servers’ motivation 
to serve groups that are perceived to be poor tippers. Indeed, there is a  
growing body of both qualitative and quantitative research documenting the 
effects of expecting low tips on service discrimination against foreigners, 
ethnic minorities, and others.54 Some indication of how pervasive such 
tipping-based service discrimination is likely to be can be found in the  
responses to two additional survey questions in the 700-server study that I 
discussed above.55  
One question asked the servers to rate a number of different consumer 
groups on a scale of “very bad” to “very good” tippers. As depicted in Ex- 
hibit 3.6, foreigners, teenagers, coupon users, Blacks, Hispanics, Christians, 
and the elderly are all widely perceived to be below-average tippers. Again, 
the sample was not representative, but regression analyses indicated that  
servers’ perceptions of various groups’ tipping behavior did not vary much 
across servers’ geo-demographic and workplace characteristics (see Exhibit 
3.7). Thus, these perceptions are held by a wide range of restaurant servers.56 
 
Exhibit 3.6. Average perceptions of the tipping of various consumer groups by U.S. 
waiters and waitresses. Idea for graphic from Tim Urban at http://waitbutwhy.com/ 
2014/04/everything-dont-know-tipping.html. 
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Exhibit 3.7. Servers’ perceptions of various groups’ tipping behavior do not vary 
much across servers’ geo-demographic and workplace characteristics (standardized 
regression coefficients). 
Server Charac-
teristics/ 
Predictors 
Perceptions of Group as Good Tippers 
 Foreign- 
ers 
Teen- 
agers 
Coupon 
Users 
Blacks His-
panics 
Chris-
tians 
Elderly 
Age -.04 .11* .05 .11* .06 -.003 .14** 
Femalea .08* -.04 .02 .01 -.01 .01 .06 
Whitea -.02 -.01 -.08 -.03 .01 .02 -.07 
Marrieda -.02 -.02 -.05 -.01 .05 .03 -.03 
Midwestb .06 .03 -.08 -.07 .10 -.06 -.04 
Southb .10 -.03 -.05 -.06 .08 -.15* -.06 
Westb .09 -.10* -.04 .08 -.02 .001 -.03 
Inexpensive 
Restauranta 
.01 -.01 .02 .08 .01 .01 -.07 
Moderately 
Expensive 
Restauranta 
-.08 -.04 .01 -.01 -.08 -.04 -.08 
Suburban 
Restauranta 
-.03 -.01 .02 -.04 -.01 .03 .06 
Urban 
Restauranta 
-.08 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.07 .10 .10 
Lots of foreign 
customersa 
-.13** -.03 -.05 .01 .03 -.08 -.04 
Lots of ethnic 
minority 
customersa 
.02 -.03 .02 -
.17*** 
-.15** .01 -.003 
Lots of 
elderly/retired 
customers a 
.06 .07 -.03 -.01 .08 .003 .02 
        
R2 .06** .04 .02 .08*** .05* .03 .04 
N 603 624 572 595 568 479 629 
a yes=1, no=0,  b compared to the Northeast, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
The second question asked servers how often they had given substandard 
service to customers expected to be poor tippers. Thirty-eight percent of the 
servers acknowledged at least sometimes doing so (see Exhibit 3.8). This 
tendency to give substandard service to customers perceived to be poor 
tippers did not vary much across servers’ geo-demographic and workplace 
characteristics, but was greater for servers who were younger, lived in the 
northeast (especially compared to the south), and had lots of ethnic minority 
customers (see Exhibit 3.9). Overall, if servers’ self-reports are to be believed, 
tipping motivated service discrimination is not common, but is not rare either. 
Since this service discrimination is most likely to be directed at foreigners, 
teenagers, coupon users, Blacks, Hispanics, Christians and the elderly,  
restaurateurs with a large proportion of one or more of these groups in their 
customer base may find that abandoning tipping improves their restaurants’ 
overall service evaluations.  
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Exhibit 3.8. Thirty-eight percent of U.S. servers admit that they sometimes (or more 
often) give substandard service to customers expected to be poor tippers.  
 
Exhibit 3.9. Servers’ tendencies to give substandard service to customers perceived 
to be poor tippers do not vary much across servers’ geo-demographic and workplace 
characteristics, but are greater for servers who are younger, male, live in the north- 
east (especially compared to the south), and have lots of ethnic minority customers 
(standardized regression coefficients). 
Server Characteristics/Predictors Frequency of Substandard Service to Poor Tippers 
Age -.23*** 
Femalea -.09* 
Whitea -.03 
Marrieda .02 
Midwestb -.07 
Southb -.10* 
Westb -.04 
Inexpensive restauranta .01 
Moderately expensive restauranta -.03 
Suburban restauranta .01 
Urban restauranta -.05 
Lots of foreign customersa -.04 
Lots of ethnic minority customersa .13** 
Lots of elderly/retired customers a -.03 
  
R2 .08*** 
N 629 
a yes=1, no=0,  b compared to the Northeast, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Does tipping reduce teamwork among servers? 
Although tipping may motivate servers to take care of their own customers, 
some people argue that it lowers overall service quality by discouraging co-
operative teamwork among servers.57 Empirical comparisons of server team 
work in tipped and non-tipped restaurants is not available, but Rachel Barkan 
and her colleagues have compared server competitiveness in individual-tip vs 
pooled-tip cafés in Israel.58 In one study, they found that server competitive- 
ness is greater in cafés with individual tips than where tips are pooled. A 
follow-up study found that differences in service levels between individual-
tip and pooled-tip cafes depended on how visible servers’ efforts were to one 
another. Among cafés with large open spaces where servers could observe 
one another (and, therefore, punish slackers), service was faster and more 
problem-free under the pooled-tip system. However, among cafés with 
multiple separate dining spaces where servers could not observe one another, 
service was faster and more problem-free under the individual-tip system. 
These findings suggest that abandoning individual tipping will improve team- 
work, but will also increase server slacking unless mechanisms are in place 
to detect and punish slackers. That may be why another researcher, Samuel 
Zakay, found that Zagat service ratings of 74 restaurants in NYC were  
unaffected by whether the restaurants pooled tips.59 Three studies is not 
much to go on and more research on this topic is needed, but the available 
evidence suggests that improvements in teamwork brought about by abandon- 
ing tipping will not routinely outweigh the resulting loss in individual server 
motivation. 
 
What are the net effects of tipping on customer satisfaction? 
Weighing the evidence described above, I believe that the positive effects 
appear to be better established, stronger, and more generalizable than the 
negative effects. Thus, I believe that tipping has a net positive effect on  
customer satisfaction in most settings. Three studies by Rob Kwortnik and I 
directly support this belief.60 One study found that consumers’ online reviews 
of Carnival cruises were higher before the cruise line replaced voluntary 
tipping with automatic service charges than afterwards (average ratings = 4.0 
vs. 3.7, t (1117) = 1.77, one-tailed p < .04). A second study found that 
service ratings in 1995 were higher for 54 cruise ships with voluntary tipping 
than for 16 ships with no tipping (average ratings = 7.45 vs. 7.05, F (1, 61) = 
5.84, p < .02), after statistically controlling for the ratio of passengers to  
crew, passenger space ratio, ship dress code, and price tier. The final study 
found that Miami Beach restaurants with voluntary tipping had higher Zagat 
service ratings than did those with service charges (average ratings = 19.5 vs 
18.5, t (102) = 2.62, p < 05), after controlling for food, décor, and cost  
ratings. The sizes of these effects were modest – 0.3 out of 5 points, 0.4 out 
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of 10 points, and 1.0 out of 33 points – and many non-tipping establishments 
received high ratings, so tipping is not necessary to satisfy guests, but it does 
appear to help. 
 
4. Does Tipping Increase Demand by Reducing the Costs of  
    Eating Out or Perceptions of Restaurant Expensiveness? 
 
Many restaurateurs fear that replacing tipping with either service charges or 
higher service-inclusive menu prices will increase the actual or perceived 
expensiveness of their restaurants and, thereby, reduce sales. The available 
evidence supports these fears, as explained below. 
 
How many substandard tippers would face price increases if tipping were 
abandoned? 
The voluntary nature of tipping means that people can limit their payment 
for the service component of the restaurant dining experience to an amount 
as low as they want. The hope is that extremely low tips from price-sensitive 
customers will be made up for with larger tips from price-insensitive cus- 
tomers. In essence, tipping enables wealthy and price-insensitive customers 
to subsidize the dining experiences of poor and price-sensitive customers.61 
Eliminating tipping and forcing everyone to pay the same amount for service 
removes this subsidy, which is likely to decrease demand from restaurants’ 
poorer and more price-sensitive customers.  
To get some sense of the magnitude of this threat, I used April 2013 
charge sales and tip data from seven restaurant chains (provided by NCR) 
and calculated the proportion of customers who would be forced to pay more 
under systems that replaced tipping with menu price increases or service 
charges of 15 percent, 18 percent, or 20 percent. Collectively, the restaurant 
chains operated in 48 states (and the District of Columbia) and spanned a 
wide range of price-tiers, with median check sizes ranging from $13 to $135. 
Overall, 24 percent of the restaurant’s patrons tipped less than 15 percent of 
the bill, 46 percent of them tipped less than 18 percent of the bill, and 66 
percent of them tipped less than 20 percent of the bill. These percentages 
varied only a little with restaurant price-tier (see Exhibit 4.1). They also 
varied a little across states, with the Northeast having fewer substandard 
tippers (see Exhibit 4.2). Nevertheless, the data suggest that almost all  
restaurants replacing tipping with service charge or service-inclusive menu 
pricing systems would raise prices on a substantial proportion of their cus- 
tomers, and to the extent that those customers are price sensitive, would see 
some decrease in sales and profits. 
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Exhibit 4.1. Across a wide range of restaurant price-tiers, roughly 25, 45 and 65 
percent of restaurant customers tip less than 15%, 18% and 20% of the bill respec- 
tively and would face higher prices under corresponding service charges or higher 
service-inclusive prices.  
 
Exhibit 4.2. The proportion of customers tipping less than 15 percent varies a little 
across states with the fewest bad tippers living in the North Eastern United States (based 
on charge data from a national restaurant chain whose median bill size is $34). 
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How would the price increases associated with abandoning tipping affect 
restaurant sales? 
While it is hard to say precisely what effect changes in menu prices would 
have on restaurant sales, I can make an estimate based on existing data. Two 
recent econometric studies of consumer expenditures on food away from 
home indicate that a 1-percent increase in prices reduces expenditures at sit-
down or full-service restaurants by 1.3 to 2.0 percent.62 A third study found 
that a 1-percent increase in prices reduces consumer expenditures by .92 
percent at casual restaurants, .79 at mid-range restaurants, and .58 at fine 
dining restaurants.63 These numbers suggest that a 15-percent hike in restau- 
rant prices will reduce sales by anywhere from 9 to 30 percent! Of course, 
replacing tipping with a 15-percent service charge or with 15-percent higher 
menu prices does not increase the cost of dining by 15 percent, because 
those price increases are offset by the fact that patrons no longer have to tip. 
However, it would increase costs somewhat for the roughly 25 percent of 
customers who tip less than 15 percent of the bill. The mean tip left by sub-
15-percent tippers is roughly 12 percent of the bill in the restaurant samples 
described above. A 15-percent service charge or price hike would raise those 
people’s costs of eating out by about 3 percentage points, which would  
reduce their demand by 1.7 to 6 percent. Since they represent roughly a 
quarter of all restaurant patrons, overall demand would decline by about .5 to 
1.5 percent assuming no other changes.  
Of course, many big tippers would pay less under no-tipping systems. 
While one might expect that this would increase their demand for restaurant 
services, any such effect is likely to be small. A survey I did a few years  
back found that consumers’ sensitivity to restaurant prices was negatively 
related to the amounts they tipped (r with cash tip = -.21, n = 160, p < .008; r with 
percent tip = -.14, n = 493, p < .003; see Exhibit 4.3).64 This means that big 
tippers are less responsive to restaurant price changes than are small tippers. 
Furthermore, other research has found that all consumers tend to be more 
sensitive to price increases than to price decreases.65 These findings suggest 
that any positive effects of eliminating tipping on the demand of big tippers 
will be too small to fully offset its negative effects on the demand of small 
tippers. 
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Exhibit 4.3. Big tippers are less sensitive to restaurant prices than are small tippers, 
so eliminating tipping will reduce demand from small tippers more than it will 
increase demand from big tippers.   
 
 
Are non-tipping restaurants perceived as more expensive than tipping ones 
when the total costs of each are similar? 
Even if actual total costs to consumers are unaffected, there are reasons to 
believe that replacing tipping with either higher service-inclusive menu prices 
or automatic service charges will increase perceptions of restaurant expen- 
siveness and, thereby, reduce demand. The reasons for this effect differ for 
service-inclusive menu prices and service charges. Service-inclusive menu 
prices present customers with one consolidated price, while voluntary tipping 
and service charges present them with separate prices for the food and service 
components of the dining experience. Marketing researchers have found that 
presenting separate prices for each component in a bundle of components (as 
opposed to presenting one total price) often reduces perceptions of expensi- 
veness. This occurs because consumers tend to focus on the more salient or 
expensive component’s price and fail to fully process or integrate the other 
components’ prices.66 If this pattern holds with consumers’ evaluations of 
restaurant expensiveness, then consumers will focus on menu prices and per- 
ceive restaurants with no-tipping and higher, service-inclusive menu prices 
as more expensive than restaurants with voluntary tips or service charges that 
are offset with lower prices.  
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As just mentioned, automatically adding service charges presents custom- 
ers with separate prices for the food and service components of the dining 
experience, so it should not increase perceptions of restaurant expensiveness 
in the same way or to the same extent that service-inclusive menu pricing 
does. However, the mandatory nature of service charges may draw more 
attention to them than is drawn to voluntary tips, so consumers may incor- 
porate service charges into their perceptions of restaurant expensiveness more 
than they incorporate voluntary tips. If so, then restaurants with automatic 
service charges should be perceived as more expensive than comparably 
priced restaurants with voluntary tipping.  
Shuo Wang and I tested these ideas in a series of experiments presenting 
subjects with information about hypothetical restaurants – including informa- 
tion about their tipping policies, which were randomly varied across subjects 
– and asking them to rate the expensiveness of the restaurants.67 The results 
of those studies are summarized in Exhibit 4.4. We found that restaurants 
with voluntary tipping were perceived as significantly less expensive than 
restaurants with service charges, which in turn were perceived as less expen- 
sive than restaurants with 15-percent higher service-inclusive menu prices. 
Importantly, these effects held for big and small tippers alike, which means 
that even customers whose total costs (including tips) were lower under the 
no-tipping systems thought the restaurant was more expensive under those 
systems than under voluntary tipping. Furthermore, these effects were true 
even when customers were aware of the total combined costs of eating at the 
restaurant. These findings suggest that consumers treat tips and service charges 
separately from menu prices in their mental accounting of restaurant dining. 
 
Exhibit 4.4. Consumers perceive restaurants with voluntary tipping as less expensive 
than restaurants with automatic service charges which are perceived as less expensive 
than restaurants with service inclusive pricing (rated expensiveness on a 7 point scale). 
Source / Type of Service / 
Restaurant Information Provided 
Voluntary 
Tipping 
No Tipping   
(15% higher 
menu 
prices) 
15% 
Service 
Charge 
18% 
Service 
Charge 
22% 
Service 
Charge 
Lynn & Wang (2012:S1)  /  
Menu Service / Pictures & Menu 
3.9a 4.7d 4.3b 4.4bc 4.7cd 
Lynn & Wang (2012: S2)  /  
Menu Service / Pictures & Menu 
4.6a 4.9c 4.7b 4.9c  
Lynn & Wang (2013) /  
Menu Service / Pictures & Menu 
3.5a 4.1b 3.6a   
Wang (2013: S1) /  
Brunch Service / Flyer Only  
3.3a 4.2b 3.6c   
Wang (2013:S2) /  
Brunch Service / Flyer Only 
3.4a  3.7b   
Wang (2013:S3) /  
Brunch Service / Flyer Only 
2.7a 3.0b    
*Means in each row with different superscripts are significantly different from one another at the p 
< .05 level. 
 147 
Three of the studies in Exhibit 4.4 also measured patronage intentions. In 
those studies, the effects of service charges (vs tipping) on perceived restau- 
rant expensiveness decreased ratings of intentions to patronize the restaurants 
by .00, .04, and .17, on a seven-point scale, while the effects of menu 
inclusive pricing (vs tipping) decreased ratings of intentions to patronize the 
restaurant by only .12 out seven points. These small indirect effects of the 
pricing system on patronage intentions through perceived expensiveness 
(holding actual expensiveness constant) do not give cause for alarm. However 
hypothetical scenarios seem likely to underestimate price effects on demand.  
In summary, the evidence suggests that abandoning tipping will increase 
costs for, and decrease demand from, a substantial subset of restaurant  
customers. Unfortunately, it is impossible to accurately quantify this effect 
ahead of time. In addition, abandoning tipping will increase the perceived 
expensiveness of restaurants even among generous tippers who will see no 
real increase in their total costs. That effect will be stronger if tipping is 
replaced with higher service-inclusive menu prices than if it is replaced with 
automatic service charges, but again it is impossible to accurately quantify 
the effect on restaurant demand ahead of time. What we can say is that these 
negative effects on demand will be smaller for more expensive restaurants, 
because their customers are less price sensitive and fewer of their customers 
are substandard tippers who will see an increase in their real costs if tipping 
is abandoned.  
 
5. Does Tipping Increase (or Decrease) the Costs of Doing Business? 
 
Many people think tipping reduces the costs of doing business. While that is 
certainly true for some costs, it is also true that tipping increases other costs. 
To shed light on that issue, let’s examine the major cost advantages and dis- 
advantages of tipping. 
 
How does tipping affect the costs of hiring? 
Federal law and the laws of many states allow employers to count a portion 
of tip income toward minimum wage requirements. This tip credit allows 
restaurants to pay tipped workers less than they would otherwise have to be 
paid, so tipping clearly reduces payroll costs by the size of the tip-credit 
reduction (see Exhibit 5.1). Even though payrolls are somewhat reduced, 
cost savings are generally passed on to consumers in the form of lower menu 
prices. In fact, the excess pay that tipping often gives servers costs restaurants 
more in lost revenues from lower prices than they gain from payroll reduc- 
tions, as I explained earlier. Thus, tipping may actually increase the net costs 
of hiring workers. 
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Exhibit 5.1. The payroll savings provided by tipping increase with the ($) tip credit, 
which differs across states as shown above. 
 
 
How does tipping affect sales-contingent costs (or commissions)? 
Restaurants’ taxes, rent, and marketing costs are often tied to sales figures. 
Tipping reduces these sales-contingent costs (or commissions) by reducing 
menu prices and, thus, sales totals. The benefit of those commission reduc- 
tions is hidden by the reduced sales, but they are real. Basically, tipping allows 
restaurants to avoid paying commissions on a portion of their labor costs, 
which increases their profits. The following hypothetical example explains 
why. 
Say that a restaurant with service-inclusive menu pricing generates 
$10,000/month in sales from which it pays $3,500/month in labor costs, 
$3,500/month in food costs, and $2,500/month in rent. Further, say that 20 
percent of its sales come from Grub Hub, which charges a 13.5 percent com- 
mission. This restaurant would make a profit of $230/month [$10,000 sales - 
$3,500 labor - $3,500 food - $2,500 rent - ($2,000 x .135 = $270) 
commission = $230 profit]. Next assume that tipping is introduced at the 
restaurant allowing labor costs to be reduced by 15 percent of the old sales 
and all of the savings would go to reduced menu prices, with no other  
changes. Now the restaurant would make a profit of $270.50/month [$8,500 
sales - $2,000 labor - $3,500 food - $2,500 rent - ($1,700 x .135 = $229.50) 
commission = $270.50 profit]. 
As this example illustrates, tipping does allow real savings on fixed 
commissions. However, similar savings can also be achieved with automatic 
service charges, which also reduce menu prices and the sales totals used to 
calculate commissions. Furthermore, because commissions are often negoti- 
ated rather than fixed, restaurants using service-inclusive menu pricing should 
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be able to negotiate lower commissions than those paid by restaurants with 
tipping or service charges. Thus, restaurants need not keep voluntary tipping 
systems on account of the savings on fixed commissions that they provide. 
 
How does tipping affect the costs of monitoring and motivating employees? 
Many economists argue that tipping exists because it is the most efficient way 
to monitor employees and motivate them to do a good job.68 The argument is 
that managers cannot always tell whether employees are delivering the kind 
of service their customers want, but customers can tell. Thus it is more  
efficient to have customers monitor and reward service via tipping. This 
belief that tipping exists because it provides the most efficient, or cost  
effective, way to monitor and motivate workers is supported by a recent 
study of mine looking at why people are more likely to tip some occupations 
than others.69 I found that the likelihood that service occupations involve tips 
increases as it becomes easier for customers than for managers to tell whether 
the workers in those occupations are doing a good job (r = .55, n = 122 
occupations, p < .001). This finding suggests that occupational differences in 
the efficiency of consumer monitoring contribute to occupational differences 
in the likelihood of a position being tipped. However, this does not demon- 
strate that tipping is a cost-effective way of monitoring and motivating service 
workers. In fact, I doubt that tipping is cost-effective, because it increases 
the need for managerial vigilance against employee theft and increases the 
difficulty of tracking, recording, and reporting servers’ tip incomes, as I 
explain next. Thus, it is not even clear whether tipping has a net positive or 
negative effect on monitoring costs, much less whether that effect offsets its 
other costs.  
 
How does tipping affect employee theft? 
One of the less frequently considered costs of tipping is its encouragement of 
employee theft in the form of servers’ giving customers free food and drinks 
in order to encourage larger tips.70 In fact, my previously mentioned survey of 
nearly 700 U.S. restaurant servers found that 20 percent admitted sometimes 
doing this, and another 10 percent admitted doing so often or all the time.71 
Only 37 percent of the servers claimed to never give customers free stuff as 
a way to increase their tips (see Exhibit 5.2). This sample of servers was not 
representative, but analyses of the data indicated that the tendency to give 
customers free food and drink did not vary much across servers’ geo -
demographic and workplace characteristics (see Exhibit 5.3). Thus, the 
results of this survey reasonably describe the behavior of many waiters and 
waitresses. Although it is not clear what the precise dollar value of the stolen 
food and drink is, it is clear that tipping motivates a substantial number of 
restaurant servers to engage in such theft. 
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Exhibit 5.2. Thirty percent of servers admit at least sometimes giving customers 
free food or drinks in order to increase the tips those customers leave. 
 
Exhibit 5.3. Servers’ tendency to give away food and drinks as a way of increasing 
tips does not vary much across servers’ geo-demographic and workplace charac- 
teristics (standardized regression coefficients). 
Server 
Characteristics/Predictors                                 
Frequency of giving away food and drinks to increase tips. 
Age     -.18*** 
Femalea -.09* 
Whitea  .004 
Marrieda -.04 
Midwestb -.01 
Southb  -.001 
Westb -.01 
Inexpensive Restauranta -.02 
Moderately Expensive 
Restauranta 
  .03 
Suburban Restauranta   .04 
Urban Restauranta   .02 
Lots of foreign customersa   .02 
Lots of ethnic minority 
customersa 
-.05 
Lots of elderly/retired 
customers a 
  .10* 
  
R2 .05** 
N 629 
a yes=1, no=0, b compared to the Northeast, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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How does tipping affect legal risks or costs? 
The rules and regulations surrounding tipping are numerous and complex. 
Employers are required by law to report all their employees’ incomes  
(including tips), to withhold employee taxes on that income, and to pay the 
employer share of FICA taxes on that income, even though the employer 
cannot be certain how much an employee makes in cash tips.72 Furthermore, 
various employment laws and regulations require employers of tipped  
workers to (1) notify affected employees of their intention to claim a tip  
credit and of any tip pooling or sharing arrangements, (2) apply the tip-credit 
allowance only for employees earning sufficient tips and only for hours  
worked in which 80 percent or more of employees’ time was spent on tip-
earning duties, and (3) ensure that only tip-eligible employees participate in 
tip-pooling or sharing arrangements.73 Documenting compliance with these 
requirements is costly and failure to comply or to document that compliance 
can be even more costly. Data on the total tipping-related tax penalties, 
lawsuit settlement amounts, court-ordered judgments, and legal fees incurred 
by restaurants each year are unavailable, but it is clear that the costs are often 
substantial for those restaurants involved. For example, Lehigh Valley 
Restaurant Group (a Red Robin franchisee) settled a tipping-related lawsuit 
for $1.3 million, Sushi Yasuda settled for $2.4 million, and Mario Batali, for 
$5.25 million.74  
One final potential legal risk of tipping deserves discussion. Consumers’ 
may tip ethnic minority servers less than they do white servers, and this may 
represent an adverse impact that would make the use of tipping to compen- 
sate employees an unlawful business practice under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.75 The legal issues involved are complex and beyond the 
scope of this report, but a number of legal scholars and practicing lawyers 
have acknowledged that this theory of the law is plausible and that a possible 
class-action lawsuit alleging adverse impact from tipping could prevail.76 
Such a lawsuit would require the plaintiff to prove the adverse impact claim, 
which a small number of studies suggest may be achievable. In one study, 
Ian Ayres and his co-authors found that black taxicab drivers in New Haven, 
Connecticut, received smaller tips from both black and white passengers than 
did white cab drivers.77 In two other studies, my co-authors and I found that 
black waiters and waitresses in Oxford, Mississippi, and Detroit, Michigan, 
received smaller tips from both black and white customers than did white 
waiters and waitresses and that those differences in tip income could not be 
attributed to differences in service delivery.78 These studies involved only a 
small number of cab drivers and restaurant servers, so I do not believe that 
they are sufficient to establish adverse impact. However, they do persuade 
me that tipping is more likely than not to have an adverse impact on black 
servers’ incomes and that efforts to find more evidence of such an adverse 
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impact through discovery or other means are likely to succeed. Thus, I  
believe that the risk of a class-action lawsuit alleging adverse impact from 
tipping is real and that it provides another reason that restaurant chains with 
an ethnically diverse wait staff should consider abandoning tipping. 
In summary, it is clear that tipping decreases some specific costs of doing 
business and increases others. Whether the net costs of doing business are 
generally higher or lower under tipping than under its alternatives is unclear 
and probably varies significantly across restaurants. For example, restaurateurs 
in California who face a high minimum wage and no tip credit see smaller 
payroll savings from tipping and greater potential revenue gains from 
replacing excessive server tip income with more reasonable wages that are 
supported by service charges or higher menu prices than do restaurateurs in 
Texas who face a relatively low minimum wage and a large tip credit. Thus, 
California restaurateurs should anticipate more cost advantages and fewer 
cost disadvantages from abandoning tipping than should the Texans. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, the evidence suggests that tipping has numerous advantages 
and disadvantages compared to service charges or higher service-inclusive 
menu prices. However, most of those advantages and disadvantages are only 
modest in size or importance and many offset one another. For example, 
tipping helps to selectively attract and retain better workers who like the per- 
formance contingent nature of tip income, but those effects are weak. Stronger 
effects are found for tipping’s enhancement of employee motivation to 
deliver friendlier and more personalized service, but those effects are offset 
to some extent by its discouragement of employee cooperation and its en- 
couragement of service discrimination against members of consumer groups 
perceived to be poor tippers. Given their modest size or offsetting nature, I 
believe that the effects of different tipping systems on employee attraction 
and retention, service quality, customer satisfaction, and the costs of operation 
can generally be set aside or ignored when choosing between those systems.79  
Overall, I come away from the data believing that biggest reason for  
restaurateurs to replace tipping is that it takes revenue away from them in the 
form of lower prices and gives it to servers in the form of tip income that is 
excessively high compared to other restaurant employees. The biggest reason 
for restaurateurs to keep tipping, on the other hand, is that it allows them to 
reduce menu prices, which increases demand. Thus, restaurateurs’ decisions 
regarding whether to keep voluntary tipping should depend on the relative 
strengths of these potential benefits and harms. The more that a restaurant’s 
servers are overpaid relative to the back of house and the wealthier and less 
price-sensitive a restaurant’s customers are, the more the owner of that  
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restaurant should consider abandoning tipping. By this reasoning, many 
upscale, expensive restaurants (especially those in states with no or small tip 
credits) probably should replace tipping with one of its alternatives, because 
they tend to have a high pay discrepancy between front and back of house, 
have few small tippers who would face a real price increase, and have price 
insensitive customers.  
Depending on the laws of the state a restaurant operates in, restaurateurs 
may have more control over revenue from menu prices than over revenue 
from service charges and should choose the higher menu price option when 
that is the case. However, when state laws allow restaurateurs to distribute 
service charges as they see fit, then service charges should be preferred over 
higher menu prices because service charges have a smaller effect on per- 
ceptions of restaurant expensiveness than do comparable increases in menu 
prices. Consumers do like higher menu prices more than service charges, but 
that preference is not likely to appreciably affect patronage. Furthermore, 
consumers’ dislike of service charges is likely to fade as consumers become 
more familiar with this compensation system. 
A final comment goes beyond the research data but deserves to be made. 
Restaurants that abandon tipping should prohibit employees from accepting 
tips and should not give customers the option of adding a tip even though 
many will want to do so. The reason for this is that once a few people start 
tipping, it puts social pressure on others to do the same, which only increases 
the number of tippers and subsequent social pressure on non-tippers.80 In 
other words, restaurateurs need to protect their customers who prefer not to 
tip from social pressures created by the few customers who do want to tip. 
Otherwise, restaurateurs will ultimately find customers reluctantly tipping 
normal amounts on top of their service charges or high, service-inclusive 
menu prices and that added cost will undoubtedly reduce demand. I have only 
anecdotal evidence to support this concern, but caution restaurateurs replacing 
tipping with service charges or higher service-inclusive menu prices that 
they need to kill tipping and not simply abandon it at their establishments. 
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